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The article analyzes various aspects of the single point of entry bank resolution strategy in 
the United States and seeks to determine the viability of legally adopting this approach in 
the Russian Federation. The single point of entry strategy provides an alternative to “bailing 
out” large bank groups and bankruptcy proceedings via controlled liquidation of the 
parent company with simultaneous financial rehabilitation of the subsidiary bank. Orderly 
Liquidation Authority detailed by Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act provides a legislative 
framework for the single point of entry strategy, but due to the doctrine only existing as a 
guideline and not directly regulated by legislation, there are several gaps in legislation that 
cause various problems in both the practical implementation of the single point of entry 
doctrine and its scientific evaluation. The insufficiently studied topic of single point of entry 
doctrine as a form of corporate liability is also examined in the article. Russian legislation 
and court practices regarding bank rehabilitation and the doctrine of “piercing the corporate 
veil” are examined to determine the possibility of legally adopting the single point of entry 
doctrine due to similarities between doctrines. The flaws and merits of the single point of 
entry doctrine are studied while accounting for potential ways to overcome the legal gaps in 
the strategy. The article reaches the conclusion that while the single point of entry doctrine is 
far from perfect, the basic principles can be applied to Russian legislation and serve as a viable 
alternative to the prevalent “bailout” practice.
Keywords: bankruptcy, single point of entry, bank rehabilitation, vicarious liability, piercing 
the corporate veil.
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1. Introduction
Single point of entry (henceforth — SPE) bank resolution is a doctrine used in the 
United States in which Orderly Liquidation Authority procedure set forth by the Dodd-
Frank Act1 (henceforth — Dodd-Frank Act) is used to resolve a solvent financial holding 
company instead of liquidating the insolvent subsidiary company, oftentimes a bank. Dur-
ing this process, bank regulators use authority provided by Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act 
to recapitalize the bank at the cost of liquidating the holding company. Thus, the single 
point of entry bank resolution doctrine combines traits of both a financial rehabilitation 
procedure and a form of corporate liability, as insolvency of a subsidiary company that is 
systemically important can be deemed sufficient to swiftly resolve the parent company in 
an administrative procedure without significant involvement of the courts.
Bank resolution in the U. S. is based on the “too big to fail” doctrine asserting that 
certain large banks are so important and interconnected that a failure of one of them could 
prove dangerous to the stability of the entire economic system. Therefore, the use of tax-
payers’ money (“bailing out”) is justified to prevent banks’ default. The Dodd-Frank Act 
was passed in the wake of the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. bankruptcy in 2008 when 
the U. S. government first “bailed out” a large bank using taxpayers’ money. Title II of the 
Dodd-Frank Act detailed the Orderly Liquidation Authority that enables the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (henceforth — FDIC) to perform an organized liquidation 
of any financial institution deemed “systemically important” (most of such institutions are 
bank holding companies) in addition to commercial banks that are rehabilitated and re-
solved via the Prompt Corrective Action procedure under Chapter 7 of the Title 11 of the 
United States Code2 (henceforth — U. S.  Bankruptcy Code). Orderly Liquidation Author-
ity became a basis for the aforementioned SPE strategy that was proposed by the Financial 
Stability Board in the year 20133 as a way to avoid spending taxpayers’ money in regard to 
supporting failing banks.
Currently most failing banks in Russia (Promsvyazbank PJSC, Bank Otkritie Finan-
cial Corporation PJSC, B&N Bank PJSC and others) are being bailed out by the Central 
Bank of the Russian Federation (henceforth — Bank of Russia) using taxpayers’ money — 
more than 2,8 trillion rubles4 (approx. 40 billion U. S. dollars), a sum equal to Moscow’s 
yearly budget, was spent in the year 2018 on the financial rehabilitation of the aforemen-
tioned bank groups. Essentially, the Bank of Russia is following the “too big to fail” U. S. 
doctrine, seeking to avoid large bank failures at all costs. However, unlike in the U. S., Rus-
sian legislators did not develop an effective alternative to “bailing out” large banks, despite 
the enormous financial costs of doing so. A SPE strategy could prove to be the answer.
1 H. R. 4173 — Dodd-frank wall street reform and consumer protection act 2010. Accessed September 
16, 2019. https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html#df2010.
2 United States Code. Title 11 — Bankruptcy. Accessed September 16, 2019. http://uscode.house.gov/
browse/prelim@title11&edition=prelim.
3 Recovery and Resolution Planning for Systemically Important Financial Institutions: Guidance on 
Developing Effective Resolution Strategies. 2013. Accessed September 16, 2019. www.fsb.org/wp-content/
uploads/r_130716b.pdf?page_moved=1.
4 “Rehabilitation cost Central Bank 2,8 trln rubles”. Kommersant. 2018. Accessed September 16, 2019. 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3674448.
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2. Basic research 
2.1. Single Point of Entry strategy
As shown by the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. example, whose bankruptcy was 
one of the main causes of the financial crisis of 2007–2008 (Gelpern, Vernon 2019), U. S. 
Bankruptcy Code resolution is not always appropriate for large financial companies, many 
of which are bank holding companies. Such companies are called systemically important 
financial institutions (henceforth — SIFI). The legal status of the SIFIs is detailed in Title I 
of the Dodd-Frank Act. SIFIs are companies that are deemed by FDIC to be integral to the 
U. S. financial system. All bank holding companies that own more that 50 million dollars 
in assets are qualified as SIFIs, but the Financial Stability Oversight Council is authorized 
to qualify other companies as SIFIs as well. SIFIs are subjects to thorough monitoring by 
the bank regulators and each SIFI is required to submit a yearly rapid resolution plan (also 
sometimes called a “living will”) to the Federal Reserve Board that details its actions in 
case of a default that would help minimize the damage to the U. S. financial system.
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes the Orderly Liquidation Authority to pro-
vide an effective procedure for SIFI resolution. The main purpose of the Orderly Liquida-
tion Authority is to grant bank regulators the means to minimize both the systematic risks 
to stability of the financial system and losses of the U. S. Department of the Treasury. In 
accordance with Section 203 of the Dodd-Frank Act, Orderly Liquidation Authority can 
be invoked by the Secretary of Treasury if the SIFI is in default or in danger of default to 
take control of it. The definition of “default or in danger of default” is provided by Section 
203 (b) (4) of the Dodd-Frank Act, but it is quite ambiguous. There are four grounds to 
invoke the Orderly Liquidation Authority: “(A) a case has been, or likely will promptly 
be, commenced with respect to the financial company under the U. S. Bankruptcy Code; 
(B) the financial company has incurred, or is likely to incur, losses that will deplete all or 
substantially all of its capital, and there is no reasonable prospect for the company to avoid 
such depletion; (C) the assets of the financial company are, or are likely to be, less than 
its obligations to creditors and others; (D) the financial company is, or is likely to be, un-
able to pay its obligations (other than those subject to a bona fide dispute) in the normal 
course of business”. Due to ambiguity of the legislation, the exact means of assessing SIFI’s 
financial state lies within the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. This provision is 
often critiqued by the scientific community as a gap in the legislation (Kupiec, Wallison 
2015, 188).
After receiving the approval of two-thirds of the voting members of the Financial Sta-
bility Oversight Council and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
the orderly liquidation commences. The Secretary takes control of the SIFI and appoints 
the FDIC as its receiver. In addition to usual rights held by receivers in Prompt Corrective 
Action, the normal procedure for liquidating banks provided for by Chapter 7 of the U. S. 
Bankruptcy Code, the FDIC has more discretion in handling the process. While Prompt 
Corrective Action can end with the company being rehabilitated, there is only one out-
come to Orderly Liquidation Authority — termination of the SIFI. 
This limitation is a subject of critique from the legal community (Skeel 2015, 116) 
as it is generally accepted that reorganization is more efficient for a company’s creditors. 
Title II Orderly Liquidation Authority is also critiqued for not providing any new tools to 
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avoid disrupting the U. S. financial system — only allowing bank regulators to liquidate 
bank holding companies under their supervision.
The SPOE (Single Point of Entry) strategy, however, resolves the default of a financial 
institution with a complicated corporate structure by taking control over the parent com-
pany, as per the Orderly Liquidation Authority, and using its assets to financially rehabili-
tate its banking subsidiaries without ever placing the bank itself in receivership or disrupt-
ing its operation. To complete this goal, the SPOE strategy proposes for the SIFI to transfer 
most assets to a special bridge bank that would only be operating as long as the financial 
aid is needed by its banking subsidiaries. Since the newly created bridge company lacks 
any significant debt or claims against them, it would be able to acquire additional funding 
from private sources, forming the Orderly Liquidation Fund. The bridge company does 
have authority to gain loans from the U. S. Treasury, but the debt must be returned and 
cannot be reimbursed using taxpayers’ money.
While the bridge company is occupied with financial rehabilitation of the bank sub-
sidiaries, the SIFI itself goes through administrative bankruptcy procedure similar to 
Prompt Corrective Action receivership, in which claims of the SIFI’s creditors would de-
termine proportional interests of all the claimants for the assets of the both the SIFI and 
the bridge company. After the bank subsidiaries are rehabilitated, the SIFI would be dis-
solved as dictated by the Orderly Liquidation Authority, while the bridge bank would be 
returned to the private sector. Claimants of the SIFI will be reimbursed for their losses 
via equity, debt or securities of the newly created company as determined by the receiver.
Another important aspect of the SPOE strategy that needs to be considered is that it 
is, essentially, a form of corporate liability — namely vicarious corporate liability. At its 
very core, the SPOE strategy uses Section 203 of the Dodd-Frank Act to initiate Orderly 
Liquidation Authority on the assumption that subsidiary bank failure would also make 
the parent company bankrupt. Then, the Secretary of the U. S. Treasury and FDIC not 
only temporally nationalize property of the parent company, but also take away corporate 
control of the holding company from the shareholders. Since the holding company usually 
owns controlling shares in its subsidiaries bank, regulators take away corporate control 
over the potentially solvent companies in the bank holding group.
It is important to note that under Section 204 of the Dodd-Frank Act it is stated that in 
Orderly Liquidation Authority creditors and shareholders are the ones will be bearing the 
losses of the SIFI. Since Orderly Liquidation Authority provides a framework for the SPOE 
strategy, creditors and shareholders of the parent company are the ones who bear the mate-
rial losses of the SPOE strategy. It is also important to emphasize that the losses of creditors 
and shareholders are somewhat limited. As mentioned before, claims to the SIFI become 
claims in the receivership of the parent company. The claims are eventually partially satis-
fied using the receivership by means of the receivership estate — consisting of the equity 
in the bridge bank, the assets that were not transferred to it, such as senior unsecured debt, 
and subordinated debt, and later with equity, debt or securities of the bridge bank.
Despite the fact that the shareholders are likely to get some corporate control over the 
newly created bridge holding company after the SPOE strategy ends and the SIFI is liq-
uidated, the corporate rights of the shareholders are disregarded during the receivership. 
It can be a most serious issue due to the administrative nature of receivership with little 
judicial control over the procedure, as only the court approval for entering into Orderly 
Liquidation Authority can be appealed to higher courts.
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SPOE provides a strategy that not only makes it possible to minimize losses of the 
U. S. Department of the Treasury by avoiding the need to “bail out” the bank, but it also 
limits the bankruptcy effects to the top-tier company in the banking group, allowing its 
subsidiaries to continue effective operation and preserve their own value. The SPOE strat-
egy is also much more likely to be used by the bank regulators for complex financial intu-
itions, as it is much more realistic to successfully take over a single parent company and 
restructure the group’s assets and liabilities from the top compared to taking over individ-
ual subsidiaries with the sole purpose of terminating them. Another important benefit of 
the SPOE strategy is the ability to limit the negative effects on the financial system to one 
banking group, avoiding bank default and external effects on the U. S. financial system.
However, the SPOE strategy is not without its downsides. The most important down-
side stems from the aforementioned poor definition of “default or in danger of default”, 
as sometimes the failure of a subsidiary bank would not cause the failure of the parent 
holding company, which is especially likely in the case of larger bank groups. In this case, 
the Secretary of the U. S. Treasury cannot use the Orderly Liquidation Authority and, by 
extension, SPE. Instead, the Secretary has to resort to Chapter 7 U. S. Bankruptcy Code 
resolution of the bank itself, despite the fact that it proves to be inefficient for such large 
financial institutions (Skeel 2014).
Another issue regarding the initiation of the SPOE strategy is the fact that the bank 
regulators might either not see a default coming or decide to not intervene. Since invoking 
the SPOE strategy is a right, not an obligation of the regulators, it can be a potential issue. 
Another downside directly stems from the harm that the SPOE strategy can do to the 
parent company, its shareholders and creditors. Aware of potential nationalization, inves-
tor risks would increase drastically prior to bankruptcy, scaring potential investors away 
and potentially worsening the existing financial situation as existing shareholders might 
be desperate to sell their shares and avoid losing their assets. All of those problems will 
further aggravate financial problems arising from a large proportion of creditors seeking 
to protect their interests at the same time.
It is noted by researchers (Simmons 2014) that it is critical for the bank holding com-
pany to have enough capitalization for the SPOE strategy to be effective. While the liabili-
ties of the parent company are not transferred to the bridge bank, the transferred resourc-
es must be sufficient to absorb the losses of its subsidiaries and preferably be enough for 
the resulting company to function properly after the rehabilitation procedures are over.
2.2. Russian legal framework for bank rehabilitation
Russian bank rehabilitation bears many similarities to the U. S. regulation on the sub-
ject matter, but due to it being a part of the Romano-Germanic legal branch it is much 
more detailed and defined in its implementation. However, it is also lacking in a few re-
gards.
According to Sec. 189.9  of the Federal Law No. 127-FZ of October 26, 2002 
“On insolvency (Bankruptcy)”5, the following measures can be implemented to prevent 
the bankruptcy of a banking organization, before withdrawal of the banking license:
1) financial rehabilitation of a bank;
5 Hereinafter all references to Russian legal acts are given by ATP “ConsultantPlus”. Accessed 
September 16, 2019. http://www.consultant.ru.
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2) the appointment of a temporary administration;
3) reorganization of the bank;
4) measures to prevent bankruptcy of a bank that has a banking license to attract 
individuals’ resources into deposits as well as open and keep individuals’ bank 
accounts which are carried out with the participation of the Deposit Insurance 
Agency of Russia (henceforth — DIA) or the Bank of Russia represented by the 
Management company of the Fund for the Consolidation of the Banking Sector 
(henceforth — Management company).
It should be noted that, much like in the U. S., implementation of the measures for 
financial rehabilitation in the presence of the grounds specified in the law is at the discre-
tion of the bank regulators and not an obligation. Proposals to impose a duty of the timely 
application of measures to prevent bank failure have been presented since 2004, but their 
use is still optional (Yulova 2004, 72–76). It is especially important to note that while in 
the U. S. the lack of such an obligation could be justified by ill-defined terminology, it is 
not the case in the Russian Federation.
According to statistics provided by Fitch Ratings 2013, until September 1, 2017, out 
of 346 banks that lost their licenses, only 35 were rehabilitated (Kholiavko, Borisiak 2017). 
It is obvious that the Bank of Russia, as a banking regulator, could have taken measures to 
prevent bank failure in more than 10 % of cases. It seems reasonable to establish two lists 
of grounds for invoking rehabilitation procedures in which less serious violations give the 
Bank of Russia the right to initiate rehabilitation procedures and more serious violations 
provide a duty to do so, in much the same way that the grounds for revoking a banking 
license from a bank are organized.
The rehabilitation measures implemented with the participation of the DIA are sub-
ject to special procedure. First, the signs of an unstable financial situation, threatening the 
interests of its creditors (depositors), should be detected in the bank’s activities. Second, 
the Bank of Russia must decide on sending representatives of the Bank of Russia and rep-
resentatives of the DIA to the bank in order to analyze the financial situation of the bank 
and to decide whether to send a proposal to the DIA to take action to prevent bankruptcy. 
The report, compiled on the basis of the results of the said audit, serves as the basis for 
making a decision on the participation of the DIA in the implementation of measures to 
prevent bankruptcy.
The Bank of Russia itself can also participate in bank rehabilitation via the Manage-
ment Company, in accordance with the decision of the Board of Directors of the Bank of 
Russia. The main function of the Fund for the Consolidation of the Banking Sector is to 
provide financial assistance with taxpayers’ money by acquiring shares of a mutual invest-
ment fund formed by the Management Company, whose assets include 75 % of ordinary 
shares of the bank in the form of a joint stock company bank (shares in the share capital, 
which provide the right to vote in the amount of at least three-quarters of the votes of the 
total votes of the bank’s participants in the form of a limited liability company). In fact, 
the bank is temporary nationalized with the procedure mirroring Title II provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, but without a required liquidation of the bank itself and carried out in 
regard to the bank, not its parent company.
It is possible to consider bankruptcy prevention measures for banking institutions 
by examining financial recovery. The main goal of financial rehabilitation is to restore 
the capital of the failing bank to the value at which banking standards, set by the Bank of 
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Russia, will be met and the bank can return to stable operation. During financial rehabili-
tation, the following measures are applied: financial assistance by the shareholders and 
other private sector parties to the bank, restructuring of assets and liabilities, changing the 
organizational structure and adjusting the size of the share capital and equity. The Bank of 
Russia also holds the right to send a request for the implementation of measures for finan-
cial recovery to the bank. In this case, the bank loses the right to distribute profits between 
its shareholders, declare and pay dividends and meet the founders’ claims for buying back 
shares of the bank, if such actions will lead to violation of mandatory standards estab-
lished by the Bank of Russia.
The temporary administration for managing a banking organization is a special gov-
erning body of a bank appointed by the Bank of Russia. The introduction of a temporary 
administration is an exception to the legal principle of non-interference in the operational 
activities of banks. It can be argued that the introduction of a temporary administration by 
the Bank of Russia has as its main goal the prevention of encroachment on the interests of 
third parties and public interests, the restoration of normal possibilities for exercising the 
rights of creditors and depositors and eliminating the threat to the stability of the banking 
system.
The temporary administration is appointed for a period of six months if one or more 
of the requirements indicated in section 189.26 of the Bankruptcy Code is present. An 
extension of the temporary administration can be granted up to 18 months total, up to 
6 months of added duration at a time. During the temporary administration, the pow-
ers of governing bodies of the bank can either be limited or suspended, which is deter-
mined at the discretion of the Bank of Russia, which either limits the legal capacity of the 
bank or suspends it altogether. A distinctive feature of the temporary administration is its 
rigid and compulsory nature, which consists in the consolidation of administrative con-
trol over the activities of a bank during the period when the temporary administration is 
introduced.
A court appeal against the decision to appoint a temporary administration to manage 
a bank, as well as the use of measures to secure claims against the bank, does not suspend 
the activities of a temporary administration to manage a bank. Therefore, the activities of 
the temporary administration cannot be suspended until a judicial act resolving the dis-
pute is issued. Therefore, the suspension of the temporary administration is possible only 
when the goals for which it was introduced were achieved or if the commercial bank was 
declared bankrupt or by a court decision.
When the powers of the executive bodies of the bank are limited, they are restricted 
in carrying out certain transactions. These transactions are related to the transfer of im-
movable property of a bank into rent, pledge, its investment into the share capital of third 
parties and otherwise disposing of property a bank whose book value is more than 1 % of 
the book value of the bank’s assets (Article 189.30 of Federal law “On insolvency (bank-
ruptcy)”, 26.10.2002 No. 127-FZ). A bank is also restricted from obtaining and issuing 
loans, issuing guarantees, assignment of claims, acceptance and forgiveness of debt, nova-
tion, compensation, fiduciary management as well as transactions with persons affiliated 
with the bank on its own will — consent of the temporary administration is required to 
carry such transactions out.
When the powers of the executive bodies of the bank are suspended, the temporary 
administration independently decides on all transactions, with the exception of transac-
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tions related to the transfer of immovable property of a bank into rent, pledge, its invest-
ment into the share capital of third parties and otherwise disposing of property a bank 
whose book value is more than 5 % of the book value of the assets of bank which includes 
obtaining and issuing loans, issuing guarantees, assignment of claims, acceptance and 
forgiveness of debt, novation, compensation and fiduciary management. The temporary 
administration does not have the right to enter into such transactions and makes them 
only upon receiving the consent of the board of directors or general meeting of the bank’s 
shareholders.
During the term of the temporary administration, a moratorium on the satisfaction 
of creditors’ claims can be issued if the powers of the executive bodies of the bank are 
suspended. The moratorium is introduced for a period of no more than three months, ex-
tendable up to the duration of the temporary administration by adding up to three months 
at a time. The moratorium applies only to monetary obligations and obligations to make 
mandatory payments that arose before the appointment of a temporary administration to 
manage the bank.
If by the time the temporary administration expires there are still grounds for its ap-
pointment, the temporary administration sends a petition to the Bank of Russia to with-
draw the banking license from the bank. The temporary administration appointed by the 
Bank of Russia, after the revocation of the license from the banking organization, acts 
from the date of its appointment until the day the court of arbitration renders a decision 
declaring the banking organization bankrupt and opens bankruptcy proceedings or until 
the court rules on the appointment of a liquidator.
Another bankruptcy prevention measure that can be applied by the Bank of Russia is 
reorganization. Such a forced reorganization is carried out in the form of either a merger 
or accession. The Bank of Russia also has the right to send a request for its reorganization 
to a bank. After receiving a demand for the reorganization of a bank, its CEO must, within 
five days of receiving it, contact the governing bodies of the bank demanding the bank’s 
reorganization. The management bodies of the banking organization are obliged, in turn, 
to notify the Bank of Russia of their decision no later than ten days after receiving the 
request. Reorganization is not a widespread measure for bankruptcy prevention in Russia 
due to the disadvantages it carries for financially stable organizations and the insufficient 
degree of legislative regulation.
The last pre-trial bank rehabilitation measure is the participation of the DIA or the 
Managing Company in the implementation of measures to prevent a bank from being 
subject to the procedure discussed above. The DIA or the Management Company acts in 
principles of good faith, reasonableness, sufficient awareness of the financial situation of 
the bank and, ideally, attempts to minimize the expenditure of taxpayers’ money. The fol-
lowing measures to prevent bank bankruptcy are used:
 — providing financial assistance — also known as bailout. Financial assistance may 
be provided to maintain liquidity or to replenish funds, for example, in the form 
of a contribution to the bank’s share capital that is being rehabilitated;
 — the organization of an auction for the sale of property that is collateral for the ful-
fillment of a bank’s obligations, including ones to the Bank of Russia;
 — performing the functions of a temporary administration for managing a bank 
with a legal status identical to the legal status of a temporary administration of the 
Bank of Russia;
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 — implementation of other methods provided by the decision on the participation of 
the DIA in the implementation of measures to prevent bankruptcy.
Also, the DIA or the Management Company has the right to acquire shares of the 
bank that is being rehabilitated in the event of the voluntary alienation of the correspond-
ing number of shares (shares) by the owners of the bank, as well as through the procedure 
of compulsory reduction of the share capital in accordance with the amount of equity and 
subsequent issue of shares.
After the procedure of reducing the share capital, additional shares may be issued by 
the bank, which will be fully or partially acquired by the DIA or the Management Com-
pany. The shares of the DIA, the Management Company and (or) the investor in the bank’s 
share capital following the results of this procedure should be at least 75 % of ordinary 
shares of the bank in the form of a joint-stock company (Article 189.49 of Federal law 
“On insolvency (bankruptcy)”, 26.10.2002 No. 127-FZ) (shares in the share capital provid-
ing at least three quarters of votes of the total number of participants’ votes in the form of 
a limited liability company) — which in essence means nationalization of the bank. It is 
also important to note that the procedure in question is not covered by the rules governing 
the procedure for coordinating actions on the issue of shares with the governing bodies of 
the bank and government authorities, which speeds up the process of rehabilitation. The 
Bankruptcy Code also contains provisions obliging the DIA or the Management Com-
pany to sell the shares of the bank being rehabilitated upon receiving an offer to sell these 
shares from the private sector. This measure exists to prevent the restriction of competi-
tion in the banking services industry and to prevent the concentration of capital in the 
hands of the DIA and, accordingly, in the hands of the state. The sale is carried out in form 
of a public auction. It is important to note just how similar the aforementioned procedure 
is to the Orderly Liquidation Authority established by the Dodd-Frank Act — the only 
significant differences being that it is applied to banks, not bank holding companies, and 
that it does not have to result in a company’s liquidation.
2.3. Russian legal framework for piercing the corporate veil
The main idea of “piercing the corporate veil” legal doctrine is to hold the controlling 
person liable for a subsidiary’s obligations in outstanding circumstances. While the term 
“piercing the corporate veil” does not appear in Russian legislation, the phenomenon still 
exists. Several legislative provisions provide for the cases in which it is possible to ignore a 
corporation’s separate legal identity to collect debts from that company’s owners — name-
ly either the parent company or the shareholders.
There are several legal provisions that allow for the vicarious liability of the control-
ling person.
The first provision is liability of the controlling persons during insolvency (bank-
ruptcy). It is important to note that even beneficiaries that are not legally affiliated with 
the subsidiary, but did control it and profited from it, can be held vicariously liable in 
bankruptcy. The second such provision is liability of the parent company arising from 
the obligations of the subsidiary in civil law — section 3 Article 67.3 of the Russian Civil 
Code (Part one) from 30.11.1994 No. 51-FZ. This provision dos not define the criteria 
for applying this ruling, but there are several aspects that Russian courts analyze in such 
cases (Shevchenko 2016): whether the parent company or beneficiary were controlling the 
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subsidiary; whether there was economic rationale for both the parent company and sub-
sidiary’s actions; whether the parent and subsidiary acted in their own interests, whether 
there was an abuse of the corporate legal identity and whether such abuse had an illicit 
purpose. These provisions, when supported by principles of Russian civil law such as rea-
sonableness of conduct, acting in good faith and prevention of the abuse of rights, allowed 
for the legal adoption of a common law concept initially alien to the Russian legal system 
that is part of Romano-Germanic legal branch (Spirina 2014).
The third provision is detailed in the Russian Tax Code (Part one) from 31.07.1998 
No. 146-FZ subsection 2 of section 2 of Article 45 that allows the Tax Service to seek taxes 
in a court procedure from the parent company instead of its subsidiary if the revenue 
from goods sold (services provided) by the subsidiary is received by the parent company. 
There are several other tax law court cases involving piercing the corporate veil in situa-
tions when the corporate legal identity of the subsidiary was only used for the purpose of 
tax evasion and thus benefited the parent company (Shitkina 2013). It is important to note 
that due to tax law being a part of public law, the necessity of upholding public interest 
justifies the application of “piercing the corporate veil” doctrine.
2.4. Possibilities of legal adoption of the single point of entry doctrine in 
Russia
Currently most banks in Russia are being rehabilitated under the direction of the 
Managing Company, and, as was previously mentioned, the Managing Company exten-
sively uses budget funds to fund the bailout of large failing banks. This situation is far 
from ideal, but currently other bankruptcy prevention measures have proven to be only 
marginally effective.
Researchers note (Tarasenko 2016) that the procedures associated with pre-trial bank 
rehabilitation are not sufficiently effective. Banks avoid the use of these procedures by 
concealing their real financial situation. Most assets of the overwhelming majority of 
bankrupt banks are artificially generated by internal postings involving banking compa-
nies as a result of suspicious transactions.
Banking regulators and legislators seem to be aware of the problem and are trying 
to resolve it. Bankruptcy prevention of banks is constantly evolving, the last innovation 
being the introduction of the Management Company in 2017. There is also one example 
of the use of the “bail-in” mechanism adopted from foreign practice of bank bankruptcy 
prevention. On April 19, 2017, the Board of Directors of the Bank of Russia approved 
changes to the DIA’s Participation Plan in the implementation of measures to prevent the 
bankruptcy of the Bank AK PERESVET (JSC)6. This procedure allowed to rehabilitate 
the bank with creditor funds instead of budget funds. The Bank’s creditors expressed a 
desire to take part in financial rehabilitation by converting funds placed in the Bank in 
the amount of 69,7 billion rubles into 20-year subordinated bonds. It is interesting to note 
that, unlike the foreign “bail-in” procedure, as a result of which creditors become share-
holders, creditors of JSC PERESVET (JSC) did not receive shares.
6 “About rehabilitation measures of AKB ‘PERESVET’ (AO)”. Press-tsentr Tsentral’nogo banka Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii. 2017. Accessed September 16, 2019. http://cbr.ru/press/PR/?file=19042017_133539ik2017-04-
19T13_35_04.htm.
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The possibility of introducing such a measure has been a topic of discussion since 
2015 (Isaeva, Sharmok 2016). The researchers note that the introduction of such a mecha-
nism would not only reduce government spending on bank rehabilitation, but would also 
allow for the protection of bank creditors’ rights more effectively. According to statis-
tics provided by the DIA, claims of the first-priority creditors are satisfied on average 
by 54,3 %, and the third priority only 6,1 %. It can be more profitable for the majority of 
creditors to convert claims that are satisfied to such a small extent than to get such an 
incomplete satisfaction of their claims. However, such a procedure can only be applied 
to smaller banks, whose creditors can afford to receive securities instead of their claims. 
Obviously, such an approach would not work with large financial institutions that provide 
their banking services to millions of individuals and hundreds of thousands of companies.
The SPOE strategy is in many ways appropriate for the Russian legal system and can 
be legally adopted. The main issue is adopting a concept that in its very nature ignores the 
corporate identity of the bank itself — a concept contradicting the vary basics of what a 
company is under Russian corporate law. However, as it was mentioned before, the Rus-
sian legal system already acknowledges the prevalence of public interest to the interests of 
companies and their legal identities in many cases. In civil law, a parent company can be 
held accountable for a subsidiary’s responsibility. In bankruptcy prevention procedures, 
bank governing bodies can be stripped of their powers and the bank can be nationalized. 
During bankruptcy itself, a controlling person can be held accountable for a company’s 
debts even if they were not formally affiliated with it. In tax law, corporate legal identity 
can be ignored if that identity is used for tax evasion purposes. A holding bank’s parent 
company is essentially liable and can use its assets to rehabilitate a failing bank by utilizing 
a Dodd-Frank based procedure that already exists in a slightly changed form for when the 
DIA or the Management Company participate in bank rehabilitation.
Another issue is formulating grounds for invoking the SPOE strategy. In the U. S. an 
ill-defined “default or in danger of default” term is used to assume that a holding com-
pany would be insolvent after the subsidiary bank goes bankrupt. Introducing a term that 
lacks clear juridical technique would be a mistake. Instead, using the SPOE strategy can 
be seen as an additional bank bankruptcy prevention measure, added to the Sec. 189.9 of 
the Bankruptcy Code and further detailed later in Title 4.1. It would also be important to 
keep the required court approval for initiation of the procedure — preferably in the form 
of summary judgment to preserve the ability to intervene timely. It would be wise to avoid 
receipting Orderly Liquidation Authority’s requirement to liquidate the holding company 
and keep the procedure itself as similar to current bank rehabilitation as possible.
A few similarities show just how noninvasive this adoption can be. First, banks are 
often owned by the holding companies, and those holdings are regulated by banking law 
(Article 4 of Federal Law from 02.12.1990 No. 395-1 “On banks and banking activity”). In 
fact, bank holding companies are the only ones in Russian legislation that have their own 
regulation — other holdings are subject to the same rules as any other company. Another 
similarity is the fact that the Bank of Russia, much like the FDIC, has a list of systemically 
important banks (Ruchkina 2018). And while their bankruptcy is not regulated separately 
and the list itself is only comprised of banks, the existence of such a list illustrates similari-
ties in bank regulators’ mindsets.
It is worth noting that the current Russian legislation does not provide for the pos-
sibility of developing and submitting an independent financial rehabilitation plan to the 
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Bank of Russia. Such an opportunity, as some authors note, would serve as an incentive to 
develop plans to restore the bank’s solvency, which would be more effective than the mea-
sures applied by the temporary administration (Ramzanov 2012). It would be especially 
appropriate for the SPOE strategy, as rehabilitating a large bank might be problematic 
even with access to the bank holding company’s funds. It would also be appropriate to 
impose additional minimum asset requirements upon the bank holding companies for the 
regulators to be able to recapitalize the failing subsidiary bank in case of its failure using 
the SPOE strategy.
3. Conclusion
In conclusion, it should be noted that currently the main problem of the bankruptcy 
prevention measures in Russia is the lack of effective alternatives for “bailing out” the fail-
ing bank. However, bankruptcy prevention measures are being actively developed. Add-
ing the SPOE strategy to the existing list of bankruptcy prevention measures would allow 
bank regulators to carry out bankruptcy prevention measures in the most efficient way. 
The SPOE strategy is, in many ways, similar to both Russian legislation on the matter of 
bank rehabilitation and the Russian doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. This similar-
ity facilitates an assessment of viability of legally adopting the single point of entry bank 
resolution doctrine in Russia.
Adoption of the SPOE strategy would benefit the Russian bankruptcy system for 
banks in several ways. First, banks would be rehabilitated more effectively with less budget 
funds spent than in the currently prevalent bailout strategy. Second, it will serve to prevent 
abuses by bank’s holding company, as such actions might provoke effective nationalization 
of the company. Third, numerous similarities in national legislation and bank resolution 
practices will likely make legal adoption noninvasive and effective, complimenting ex-
isting bank rehabilitation system without disrupting it. SPOE strategy is not a universal 
solution to bank bankruptcy, and nor it is perfect, but we believe that its basic aspects can 
be integrated into the Russian legal system to create a viable alternative to the prevalent 
practice of bailing out banks using budget funds.
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